Alexander Hamilton, 1788

“It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment;”

Alexander Hamilton used these words in Federalist No. 78, published in 1788 as part of the campaign to explain and defend the proposed United States Constitution. His subject was the judiciary. Unlike the legislature, courts did not control the public purse; unlike the executive, they did not command the power used to enforce decisions. Hamilton therefore described their characteristic function as judgment. The selected clause ends with a semicolon because the sentence continues by noting their dependence on executive assistance. That continuation prevents an easy misunderstanding. A court’s ability to pronounce a decision and its ability to make that decision effective are related, but they are not the same power.

The capitalized words FORCE and WILL distinguish different kinds of authority. Force concerns the means of carrying a command into effect. Will concerns the power to choose public measures through the political branches. Judgment requires courts to interpret and apply governing law in disputes brought before them. Hamilton’s description gives judicial independence a purpose: judges need protection from pressure so they can perform that task honestly. It does not grant them permission to substitute their own preferences for the Constitution. Later in the essay, he warns against the exercise of will in place of judgment. The distinction supplies a standard for courts as well as an argument on their behalf.

Federalist No. 78 also defends the ability of judges to treat an unconstitutional statute as invalid. Hamilton reasons that the Constitution expresses a higher authority than an ordinary legislative act. On that account, enforcing the Constitution against a conflicting statute does not make judges superior to lawmakers as people. Both institutions remain subject to the authority of the people who established the fundamental law. The argument connects judicial review with limits on delegated power. It also explains why the essay discusses tenure during good behavior and the importance of independence. A constitutional rule offers little protection if judges must abandon it whenever an influential political actor dislikes the result.

The quotation remains helpful when distinguishing a judicial decision from a general political program. Courts can have substantial consequences even when their formal instruments differ from those of elected officials. Hamilton’s description should therefore not be mistaken for proof that courts are powerless or incapable of error. Its value lies in identifying the task that justifies their authority and the institutional dependencies that constrain it. Readers can ask whether a decision explains its legal reasoning, respects the governing framework, and relies on judgment rather than personal preference. Those questions make independence and accountability parts of the same discussion: the freedom to judge is defensible because it enables a disciplined responsibility, not because judges stand outside every limit.