Congressional Review Act

Regulatory binders arranged on a congressional committee worktable

Congressional Review Act Explainer

The Congressional Review Act, commonly called the CRA, gives Congress a streamlined way to review and overturn rules issued by federal agencies. Enacted in 1996, it requires agencies to submit covered rules and related information to both houses of Congress and the Government Accountability Office before the rules can take effect. Congress may then use a joint resolution of disapproval to reject a rule. If that resolution becomes law, the rule has no force or effect.

The CRA uses the Administrative Procedure Act’s broad definition of “rule,” so coverage can extend beyond regulations published in the Federal Register. Guidance documents and other agency statements may qualify if they have future effect and implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy. The statute excludes certain actions of particular applicability, internal management or personnel rules, and procedural or organizational rules that do not substantially affect people outside the agency. Questions about whether an action is a rule can therefore be consequential.

Most rules have a review period measured in legislative days in the House and session days in the Senate. A qualifying senator may use expedited procedures that limit debate and avoid a filibuster once statutory conditions are met. Both chambers must pass the same joint resolution, and the president must sign it unless Congress overrides a veto. Because the president usually supports the current administration’s agencies, CRA disapprovals are often most practical after a change in party control of the White House and Congress.

A successful resolution does more than cancel the immediate rule. The agency may not reissue the rule in substantially the same form, or issue a new rule that is substantially the same, unless a later law specifically authorizes it. The statute does not define “substantially the same,” leaving agencies to assess how much a replacement must differ. The CRA is thus a powerful but targeted oversight tool: it can erase a rule quickly, yet it does not replace the ordinary legislative process for writing a durable policy.

An agency’s report to Congress and GAO includes a copy of the rule, a concise statement about it, whether it is classified as a major rule, and the proposed effective date. Agencies also provide GAO with available analyses and information about compliance with other regulatory requirements. A rule generally cannot take effect until the required submission occurs.

Major rules receive additional attention. GAO reports on whether the agency followed required procedural steps, and most major rules must wait at least 60 days after publication or congressional receipt, whichever is later. GAO reviews process rather than deciding whether the policy itself is wise.

A member of Congress introduces a joint resolution using the formula set by the statute. In the Senate, special procedures can allow a qualifying resolution to reach a vote without the usual supermajority needed to end debate. The House uses its own procedures. Passage by both chambers still produces legislation that must be presented to the president.

If the resolution is enacted, the rejected rule is treated as though it never took effect, or it ceases to have effect if implementation already began. The agency must also account for the restriction on substantially similar rules. Congress can later authorize a new approach through legislation if it wants the agency to proceed.

The review clock can be complicated because it depends on congressional calendars and on when the rule is received. A carryover provision can create a new review window for rules submitted late in a previous Congress. That feature lets a new Congress reconsider a group of recent agency actions, but it also makes the precise eligibility date important.

Supporters view the CRA as a democratic check on unelected regulators and a way to make Congress take responsibility for major policy choices. Critics argue that an all-or-nothing vote can discard detailed safeguards without providing a replacement and that “substantially the same” is uncertain. Its effectiveness depends on legal coverage, timing, political alignment, and whether lawmakers can agree on a joint resolution.

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