Parisa Tabriz, 2018

Parisa Tabriz in a modern browser-security workspace

“We have to stop taking a whack-a-mole approach to security.”

Parisa Tabriz used this line while describing a persistent weakness in computer security: teams often discover a vulnerability, patch that instance, and then wait for a closely related flaw to appear somewhere else. The cycle resembles an arcade game in which another target immediately rises after one is struck. In a 2018 account adapted from her Black Hat keynote, the Google security leader argued that this reactive rhythm does not scale. Modern software contains millions of lines of code, depends on many outside components, and changes continuously. Treating each report as an isolated surprise may close a visible hole while leaving the condition that produced it untouched.

The alternative is to remove whole classes of risk. That can mean replacing a memory-unsafe component, isolating untrusted code in a sandbox, adopting safer defaults, automating updates, or redesigning an interface so a dangerous action is no longer easy to perform accidentally. It also means studying incidents for patterns instead of counting closed tickets. A single fix answers, “How do we stop this exploit?” A structural response asks, “What would make this family of exploits impossible, less useful, or far easier to contain?” The second question demands more engineering investment, but it can protect users who will never know a vulnerability existed.

Chrome’s security work illustrates the layered character of that strategy. Browser processes can be separated so a compromised page does not automatically gain control of the operating system. Site isolation can place content from different origins into different processes. Automatic updates can move fixes to users quickly, while warning systems and certificate policies can reduce other avenues of attack. None of these measures creates perfect security, and attackers adapt. Their value lies in changing the economics of exploitation: an adversary must cross several boundaries rather than rely on one recurring weakness. Defense becomes a designed property of the system, not only an emergency response after harm is found.

Tabriz’s warning applies well beyond browsers. Cloud services, mobile apps, connected devices, and artificial-intelligence systems all accumulate vulnerabilities faster than human teams can investigate them individually. Organizations still need skilled responders who can patch urgent flaws, but the incident should also become evidence for better architecture, tooling, and incentives. Metrics matter here: a high number of resolved bugs may reflect productive work, yet it may also hide a design that keeps generating the same problem. Durable security comes from learning at two levels—repairing the immediate defect and reducing the chance that its relatives return. The quote turns security from an endless chase into a design discipline focused on prevention, containment, and lasting improvement.

Tabriz used the phrase in a 2018 Google article adapted from her Black Hat keynote on improving the security status quo.

She was contrasting repeated one-off fixes with work that eliminates or contains broad classes of vulnerabilities.

Immediate patches remain essential; the warning is against treating them as the complete security strategy.

Safer languages, sandboxing, secure defaults, rapid updates, and architectural isolation can make many related attacks harder at once.

Complex software changes too quickly for human teams to chase every weakness individually without systemic prevention.

Strong security programs use each incident to improve design, tools, and incentives as well as close the specific flaw.

Explore more "Quotes of The Day"

Discover more notable quotes from influential voices across politics, science, business, technology, sports, and culture. Each quote offers insight into how ideas, beliefs, and decisions shape the world around us.